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BURMYCH AND OTHERS V UKRAINE: 
 TERRIFIC TEMPLATE FOR DEALING WITH REPETITIVE APPLICATIONS OR DEPLORABLE DEVIATION? 
 
Lize R. Glas∗  
1. Introduction  
 
On 3 May 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (Court) adopted its first decision concerning the 
non-enforcement of final judgments in Ukraine. Since then, the Court has been confronted with the 
question of how it should deal with cases pertaining to the same problem. One answer was the 
adoption of a pilot judgment in the case of Ivanov v Ukraine on 15 October 2009,1 which has become 
the worst example of non-execution of a pilot judgment ever. Not only have the authorities ‘taken no 
steps’ to solve the problem,2 but also have they allegedly failed to execute some unilateral declarations 
and judgments adopted in Ivanov-type cases.3  
During the years of non-execution, the Court changed its approach to dealing with Ivanov-type 
cases several times. The Court granted the first request of Ukraine for an extension of the time limit 
set in the pilot judgment, but refused the second such request. In Ivanov, the Court adjourned dealing 
with similar cases and then switched to resuming and adjourning examining these cases several times. 
When the Court examined the cases, it first adopted a policy of awarding two different fixed-rate sums 
for damage and then a policy of awarding only one fixed-rate sum. Furthermore, the Court declared 
the Ivanov-type cases inadmissible at one point, because the applicants had not exhausted domestic 
remedies, but overturned this decision at a later date.4 Clearly, the Court has been struggling with the 
question of how to deal with Ivanov-type cases. 
 The Court gave its ultimate answer in Burmych and Others v Ukraine of 12 October 2017, when 
about 29,000 Ivanov-type cases in total had been submitted to the Court.5 The Court struck out at once 
the 12,143 cases in respect of which it had not yet adopted a ruling. These applications fall ‘to be dealt 
with in compliance with the obligation deriving from the [Ivanov] pilot judgment’.6 The Court’s decision 
has been to no avail: in June 2018, the Ukrainian authorities were ‘still at the reflection stage and no 
concrete progress has been made’.7 In my contribution, I will discuss Burmych as a template for dealing 
with a failed pilot-judgment procedure and the corresponding repetitive cases and as a deviation from 
the Court’s practice, which will enable me to answer the question in the title.8 
 
2. Burmych as a template  
 
In Burmych, the Court first joined all pending Ivanov-type cases and then struck them out under Article 
37(1)(c) ECHR.9 Subsequently, the Court transmitted the cases to the Committee of Ministers 
(Committee).10 The Court will strike out future similar cases and transmit them to the Committee as 
well.11 In a follow-up decision to another pilot judgment, the Court clarified that it will only use the 
same approach in ‘exceptional circumstances’, which exist depending on the ‘progress achieved at 
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domestic level … and the caseload’.12 Since the Court did not find a violation in Burmych,13 there is 
nothing for the Committee to supervise, also because it is supervising the general execution measures 
anyhow. For these reasons probably, the Committee instructed the Burmych applicants to approach 
the Ukrainian authorities; the Department for the Execution of Judgments ‘will not process 
communications relating the applications’.14 Therefore, transmitting the cases means just that; the 
Committee will not actually handle the cases. 
 
2. Burmych as a deviation  
 
Burmych is a deviation from the Court’s case law and European Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention) for several reasons. This is also how the Court presented the judgment: as a ‘new’ 
approach to dealing with repetitive cases if a state fails to execute a pilot judgment.15 The Court would 
previously continue or resume to examine such cases ‘in order to ensure effective observance of the 
Convention’.16 
 More specifically, the Court used Article 37(1)(c) ECHR in an unprecedented way. The Court 
‘enjoys a wide discretion in identifying grounds capable of being relied upon in striking out an 
application on this basis’.17 Despite the discretion, when the Court applied this ground in other cases, 
the applicant showed a lack of diligence or his situation had changed.18 No such thing happened in 
Burmych. Furthermore, while the authors of the provision held that the provision’s scope ‘should be 
limited to cases which are comparable to those mentioned’ under paragraphs a and b, the Court went 
beyond what is mention in these paragraphs in Burmych.19   
 The Court also deviated from how it viewed its task in previous rulings in four respects. First, 
the Court explained that, by continuing to award compensation, it would be ‘substituting itself for the 
Ukrainian authorities’, which is ‘not compatible’ with its ‘subsidiary role’.20 The Court can only exercise 
its task in a subsidiary manner when the States Parties implemented an effective system of 
fundamental rights protection. The subsidiarity principle is, however, not the only principle that guides 
the Court. When exclusive reliance on the principle would lead to ineffective protection of the 
Convention rights, because the State failed to do its part, the Court exceptionally substitutes itself for 
the domestic authorities, in order to ensure the ‘practical and effective’ protection of the Convention 
rights.21 In Burmych, the Court disregards this possibility and only mentions the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of the Convention system.22  
Second, being a mechanism for awarding compensation is also incompatible with its role 
according to the Court, because awarding compensation is ‘only accessory to [its] task’.23 The Court 
has excluded awarding compensation from its core task before. However, when previously remaking 
something along those lines, the Court nevertheless awarded just satisfaction,24 reserved the question 
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of Article 41 ECHR25 or the applicants could use a domestic remedy.26 In Burmych, these circumstances 
did not exist. Therefore, the Court not just seems to see awarding compensation as not part of its core 
task, but rather seems to exclude it completely from its task. 
Third, by resolving the ‘legal issues under the Convention’ in Ivanov, the Court considered that 
it ‘discharged its function’.27 Delivering, ‘continually, individual decisions in cases where there was no 
longer any live Convention issue’ is not its task therefore.28 The Court, however, decides thousands of 
repetitive cases each year. In 2017, the Committees adopted about half of all the judgments.29 Since 
the Committees may only render a judgment if the legal issue is ‘the subject of well-established case-
law’,30 they adopt many judgments in repetitive cases. In fact, the Committees gained the competence 
to adopt judgments in order to ‘cover repetitive cases’.31 
 Fourth, the Court explained that it is the Committee’s, not the Court’s, task to supervise the 
execution of a judgment.32 Although the Convention indeed gives this task to the Committee,33 the 
Court is involved in execution matters in the pilot-judgment procedure: it orders general measures and 
verifies whether the implemented measures are Convention compliant.34 Moreover, when the Court 
would have decided Burmych on its merits, it would not have taken on the Committee’s task, as the 
Committee does not have that competence. Therefore, it is odd that the Court sees Burmych as a way 
to ensure that it does not take on the Committee’s task.  
To conclude, for the first time, the Court refused to decide cases, because they are repetitive 
and because the State failed to implement a pilot judgment. The Court could only refuse this by 
interpreting Article 37(1)(c) ECHR very broadly, for the admissibility criteria do not require that a case 
is not repetitive. The Court motivated its decision mainly by pointing out that, by continuing to deliver 
Ivanov-type cases, it would be engaging in activities that are not its task. However, the above analysis 
demonstrated that the Court could have made other choices and that these other choices would have 
been more in line with previous practice and with the Convention than the choices made in Burmych. 
Paradoxically, although the Court presented the Burmych approach as a way to return to how it is 
supposed to function, this approach actually is a departure from how it has functioned so far. 
Therefore, the Court seems to have made a practical and pragmatic choice to deviate in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the Convention system.35  
 
3. Burmych as a terrific template or deplorable deviation?  
 
The question that remains is if the Court should have followed the Burmych approach and should 
follow it in future failed pilot-judgment procedures. More precisely, the question is whether the 
general interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the Convention system should override the interests 
of (future) Ivanov-type applicants in the effective protection of their rights (at least in Strasbourg). 
These are the two interests at stake.  
What is not at stake is the need to restore respect for how the Court should function. On the 
contrary, the Court deviated in Burmych in four regards from how it viewed its task in its previous 
rulings.36 It is also undeniable that the Ivanov-type applicants’ interests are the interests that are 
overridden. The Court presented this somewhat differently, by holding that their ‘interests … are more 
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appropriately protected in the execution process’.37 I doubt this, because the Court denied the 
applicants access and nor do they have a reasonable prospect of an effective domestic remedy. A 
judgment on the merits would at least have resulted in an award of just satisfaction and supervision 
by the Committee or the Court would have struck out the application based on a unilateral declaration 
promising redress. Although Ukraine allegedly does not execute all judgments and unilateral 
declarations, at least the Court would have found a violation, which in itself already provides some just 
satisfaction,38 or Ukraine would have admitted a violation. Furthermore, it seems more likely that 
Ukraine pays just satisfaction or the redress promised in a UD than that it will implement an effective 
domestic remedy any time soon.  
 The Convention system is indeed served by the Burmych approach, because this approach is 
more efficient than the alternative scenario of adopting judgments and approving UDs. This is mainly 
because I assume that single judges strike out future Ivanov-type cases, whereas I assume that the 
Committees of three judges would be engaged in the alternative scenario. Nevertheless, the extent of 
the efficiency gain is not exactly clear to me. The Court explained in Burmych that it will transmit future 
‘well-founded’ Ivanov-type cases to the Committee.39 Therefore, the Court seems to establish at least 
if the cases are well founded, although I am not sure if it did so in respect of the 12,143 applications 
joined in Burmych, as the dissenters remarked that the Court did not know their facts.40 If the Court 
indeed establishes the well-foundedness of the cases, it still needs to invest some time in them. 
Moreover, the efficiency gain should probably not be overstated, especially not if the Court establishes 
the well-foundedness, since the Court already had a quite effective system for dealing with the Ivanov-
type cases: the expedited Committee procedure.41 This approach was so effective that it attracted 
‘significant numbers’ of applicants.42 Moreover, the Court indicated in 2014 that an ‘advanced IT 
workflow system’ ‘will enable it to bring the backlog of repetitive cases under control within a few 
years’.43 
The practical question of efficiency gain does not help answer the principled question about 
which interest should prevail, although the former question helps put the latter question in 
perspective. The interest of the Convention system should not have overridden the interests of the 
applicants, because the Convention system is about protecting their rights in an effective manner in 
one way or another and, by taking the Burmych approach, the applicants are left without any 
protection.44 Moreover, the approach comes at other two other ‘costs’. First, the Court could only 
adopt the approach by departing in different ways from how it normally sees its task and from how 
the Convention envisages its task, as was explained above. Second, the departure comes down to 
decreasing the scope of the right to individual petition. This is in itself already regrettable considering 
the situation of the applicants, but is also regrettable because it goes against what the States Parties 
have reaffirmed several times: that this right is a ‘cornerstone’ of the Convention system.45 Protocol 
14 has given the Court to possibility to declare an application inadmissible for a lack of a significant 
disadvantage.46 If the States would have wanted to give the Court the power not to deal with (certain) 
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repetitive cases or to choose which cases it decides even if they fulfil the admissibility criteria,47 they 
would done so. In Burmych, the Court gave itself this power, based on a very far-reaching 
interpretation of Article 37(1)(c) ECHR. 
In conclusion, I see Burmych as a deplorable deviation, although it is an understandable 
deviation in the face of Ukraine’s inertia and the massive influx of Ivanov-type cases. The deviation is 
overly pragmatic and, thereby, disregards some principles in the Convention and the Court’s case law. 
This is also a deviation that is so far reaching that the States Parties should initiate it, not the Court. 
Considering the aforesaid, I think that the Court should, when considering in October 2019 whether it 
should restore the cases that it stuck out in Burmych,48 return those cases to its list and decide them 
on their merits. Thus, the Court limits the impact of the deplorable deviation.  
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Appendix 1  
 
Timeline of the steps taken by the Council of Europe regarding the non-enforcement of final 
judgments in Ukraine 
 
3 May 2001 Court adopts first decision on the non-enforcement of final judgments in 
Ukraine49 
6 March 2008  Committee adopts interim resolution50  
15 October 2009  Court adopts Ivanov v Ukraine pilot judgment, including adjournment of all 
new and pending cases51  
3 December 2009  Committee adopts interim resolution 52  
11 February 2010 Court communicates all Ivanov-type cases pending on the date of delivery of 
Ivanov for information and possible action and, at the same time, 
adjournment of these cases until 15 January 201153 
30 November 2010 Committee adopts interim resolution 54  
10 December 2010  Government requests first extension time limit55 
15 January 2011  Time limit in pilot judgment expires  
18 January 2011  Court grants first request extension time limit56 
14 July 2011 Government requests second extension time limit57 
15 July 2011  New time limit expires58  
6 September 2011  Court refuses second request extension time limit59 
14 September 2011  Committee adopts interim resolution 60  
21 February 2012 Court resumes examining Ivanov-type cases61 
3 July 2012 Court adopts Kharuk and Others judgment (first grouped judgment in Ivanov-
type cases) with two fixed-rate sums for damage62 
6 December 2012 Committee adopts interim resolution63 
20 June 2013  Court adopts policy of awarding one fixed-rate sum for damage64  
12 September 2013 High level consultations in Kyiv65 
11 March 2014  Court adjourns examining Ivanov-type cases for six months66 
3 June 2014 Court approves the implemented legislative measures and declares 5,600 
cases inadmissible67 
2 September 2014 Court adjourns examining Ivanov-type cases for one year68 
20 January 2015 Court resumes examining Ivanov-type of cases69 
                                                          
49 Kaysin and Others v Ukraine App no 46144/99 (ECtHR, 3 May 2001); Burmych (n 3), para 10.  
50 Committee, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2008), 6 March 2008.  
51 Ivanov (n 1).   
52 Committee, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2009)159, 3 December 2009 
53 Burmych (n 3), paras 16-17. 
54 Committee, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2010)222, 30 November 2010.   
55 Committee, Communication from the Registry of the European Court, DH-DD(2011)54, 26 January 2011.   
56 ibid.  
57 Committee, Communication from the Registry of the European Court, DH-DD(2011)757, 27 September 2011.  
58 Committee (n 55).    
59 Committee (n 57).  
60 Committee, Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2011)184, 14 September 2011.  
61 ECtHR, ‘Press Release; Court Decides to Resume Examination of Applications concerning Non-enforcement of Domestic 
Decisions in Ukraine’, 29 February 2012, ECHR 086 (2012).  
62 Kharuk and Others App no 703/05 (ECtHR, 26 July 2012).  
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68 Burmych (n 3), para 36. 
69 ibid, para 37. 
14 April 2015 Court allows the Government to submit observations in 250 cases per month70 
December 2015 Court adjourns delivering judgments in Ivanov-type cases pending Burmych71 
7 June 2017  Committee adopts interim resolution72 
12 October 2017 Court adopts Burmych judgment73  
17 November 2017  High level meeting in Strasbourg74 
27 March 2018 Round table in Kyiv75 
19 April 2018 Launching of the Council of Europe project “Supporting Ukraine in execution 
of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights”76 
October 2019 Court may reassess the situation77  
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